

The Political Economy of Great Power Competition

Instructor: Alexander Tippet (tippetta@uchicago.edu)

Course Description:

In recent years, competition between great powers has once again begun to shape international politics and global economic activity. This discussion-based course will explore accounts that link great power behavior to economic dynamics and vice versa. How do great powers manipulate economic forces during periods of competition? How do economic incentives guide great powers? Each week we will discuss one theme, ranging from trade and finance to energy and technology, and draw out its relationship to competition between great powers. While primarily drawing on work in international relations and political science, this course will also engage with work produced in disciplines like history and sociology. At the conclusion of this course students will be able to analyze the role finance, energy, trade and other variables have played in historical instances of great power competition and apply those insights to contemporary academic and/or policy debates.

Requirements & Evaluation:

Grades for this course will be based on participation in class discussion, a final paper, and a series of assignments intended to prepare students to write their final paper.

Participation (10 points): Students must regularly participate in class discussions and engage with the texts read that week. Aim for one or two high quality contributions per week. If you find participation difficult or uncomfortable, book an office hours slot early in the quarter to discuss possible alternatives.

Final Paper (45 points): Students will be expected to write an original paper (15 – 20 pages) on a topic related to the course material. Students will have two options for how to approach this paper.

Paper Option 1 (Research Paper): For this paper option, students will make an intervention in an academic discussion or debate related to this course. Students will offer a novel account or theory that challenges, amends, or clarifies academic conventional wisdom.

Paper Option 2 (Policy Paper): For this paper option, students will make an intervention in a policy discussion or debate related to this course. Students will offer a policy proposal and describe its intended consequences, its relationship to existing policy or policy proposals, and trade-offs or tensions associated with the policy.

Students will be assessed on their ability to accurately survey existing academic or policy debates, make an original intervention into those debates, support that intervention with careful evidence and anticipate possible objections. The final paper will be due in week 10 of the term.

Preparatory Assignments (40 points): Students will be expected to complete four assignments that will support the development of their final paper.

Week 2: Topic Proposal (10 points) – For this assignment, students will highlight two topics they are interested in writing their paper on.

Week 4: Literature Review (10 points) – For this assignment, students will review an existing academic or policy literature and identify two interventions they could potentially make in this literature.

Week 5: Data Description (10 points) – For this assignment, students will identify two sources of qualitative or quantitative data that could be used to buttress a specific intervention into an existing academic or policy debate.

Week 8: Paper Outline (10 points) – For this assignment, students will outline their final paper. They will identify the main contours of the debates they are intervening in, outline their proposed intervention, and identify the qualitative or quantitative data they will use to provide empirical support for their intervention, and describe potential objections to their intervention as well as their planned responses.

Late Policy:

All deadlines are strict. Assignments received late will be dropped half a letter grade for each 24 hours past the deadline.

Professionalism:

This class is committed to creating an inclusive environment in which everyone can participate. All students must follow basic norms of respectful intellectual exchange. Be generous and thoughtful when engaging with other students and the instructor. Respectfully disagree by suggesting a different view rather than forcefully contradicting. Misconduct related to gender, race, religion or sexual orientation is unacceptable.

Accessibility:

Students with Letters of Accommodation are encouraged to contact me as early in the quarter as possible to ensure that I can provide you with the necessary accommodation in a timely fashion. For those without Letters of Accommodation, assistance is available to eligible students through Student Disability Services. If you have a particular concern surrounding inclusiveness or accessibility, please see me as soon as possible so we can make proper arrangements.

Academic Integrity & AI Policy:

All work for this course is governed by the University of Chicago's standards for academic integrity. Students are responsible for familiarizing themselves with, and following, university policies regarding proper student conduct. Being found guilty of academic dishonesty is a serious offense and may result in a failing grade for the assignment in question, and possibly for the entire course.

AI can be useful in academic settings—but only when used carefully. Students may not submit any work generated by an AI and are also strongly discouraged from using AI tools as writing aids. Students may use AI tools to brainstorm ideas or carry out certain kinds of research tasks like identifying sources, but they should be aware that AI tools can make mistakes or hallucinate. If you have a question about a specific use case for AI, please contact me.

Class Schedule:

Week 1: Great Power Competition

This week, we will first discuss course requirements and logistics. Then, we will discuss the historical instances of “great power competition.” When do such competitions arise? What tools do states deploy during such competitions? And what are their stakes?

Required Readings (Pick Two):

- Crowe, Eyre. “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany.” January 1, 1907. Pages 402 – 407.
- U.S. National Security Council. “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC-68).” April 14, 1950. Pages 4 – 12.
- U.S. Department of Defense. “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.” January 19, 2018.

Week 2: Trade (1)

This week we will discuss the ways in which trade flows—or expectations about trade flows—can push states towards different kinds of behavior. We will begin with a discussion of theories that tie trade to peaceful relations between states (Oneal and Russett 1997) before discussing accounts that link trade relations to conflict (Copeland 1996) and domestic debates over foreign policy (Trubowitz 1998; Solingen 1994).

Required Readings:

- John R. Oneal et al., “The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85,” *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 1 (1996): 11–28, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343396033001002>.
- Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,” *International Security* 20, no. 4 (1996): 5–41, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539041>.
- Trubowitz, Peter. *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy*. University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pages 1-11, 31-37, 52-95.
- Solingen, Etel. “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint.” *International Security* 19, no. 2 (1994): 126–69. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539198>.

Additional Readings:

- Fordham, Benjamin O. “The Domestic Politics of World Power: Explaining Debates over the United States Battleship Fleet, 1890–91.” *International Organization* 73, no. 2 (ed 2019): 435–68. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000449>.
- Lobell, Steven E. *The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics*. University of Michigan Press, 2003.
- McMillan, Susan M. “Interdependence and Conflict.” *Mershon International Studies Review* 41, no. 1 (1997): 33–58. <https://doi.org/10.2307/222802>.
- Narizny, Kevin. *The Political Economy of Grand Strategy*. 1st edition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007.

Week 3: Trade (2)

This week we will discuss the ways states can shape trade flows. We will discuss theories linking trade patterns and preferences to the distribution of state power (Krasner 1978) how states can use trade policy to deny rivals access to technology or resources (Mastanduno 1988), apply coercive pressure (Kim and Margalit 2021), or offer strategic inducements (Mastanduno 2003).

Required Readings:

- Krasner, Stephen D. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” *World Politics* 28, no. 3 (1976): 317–47. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009974>.
- Mastanduno, Michael. “Strategies of Economic Containment: U.S. Trade Relations with the Soviet Union.” *World Politics* 37, no. 4 (1985): 503–31. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010342>.
- Kim, Sung Eun, and Yotam Margalit. “Tariffs As Electoral Weapons: The Political Geography of the US–China Trade War.” *International Organization* 75, no. 1 (January 2021): 1–38. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000612>.
- Mastanduno, Michael. “The Strategy of Economic Engagement: Theory and Practice.” In *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate*, edited by Edward Deering Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins. University of Michigan Press, 2003.

Additional Readings:

- Baldwin, David A., and Ethan B. Kapstein. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020.
- Berger, Daniel, William Easterly, Nathan Nunn, and Shanker Satyanath. “Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade during the Cold War.” *American Economic Review* 103, no. 2 (April 2013): 863–96. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.2.863>.
- Bown, Chad P. “The Return of Export Controls.” *Foreign Affairs*, January 24, 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/return-export-controls>.
- Campbell, Kurt M., and Ely Ratner. “The China Reckoning.” *Foreign Affairs*, February 13, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning>.
- Gowa, Joanne. *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*. Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Jentleson, Bruce W. *Sanctions: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2022.

- Johnston, Alastair Iain. “The Failures of the ‘Failure of Engagement’ with China.” *The Washington Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (April 3, 2019): 99–114. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1626688>.
- Lai, Christina. “Acting One Way and Talking Another: China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy in East Asia and Beyond.” *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 2 (March 4, 2018): 169–87. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1357652>.
- Meijer, Hugo. *Trading with the Enemy: The Making of US Export Control Policy toward the People’s Republic of China*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Mulder, Nicholas. *The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War*. New Haven, Conn. London: Yale University Press, 2022.
- Pape, Robert A. “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work.” *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997): 90–136. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539368>.
- David Shambaugh, *Breaking the Engagement: How China Won & Lost America* (Oxford University Press, 2025).

Week 4: Production

This week we will discuss the impact production has on the outcomes of great power competition (Fear 2015 & Brooks 2007), how competition informs the organization of production (Lee 2020 & Thorpe 2014) and how the organization of production can constrain or enable state action (Brooks 2007 & Thorpe 2014).

Required Readings:

- Fear, Jeffrey. “War of the Factories.” In *The Cambridge History of the Second World War: Volume 3: Total War: Economy, Society and Culture*, edited by Michael Geyer and Adam Tooze. 2015.
- Thorpe, Rebecca U. *The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. Chapters 3, 5.
- Lee, James. “US Grand Strategy and the Origins of the Developmental State.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43, no. 5 (July 28, 2020): 737–61.
- Brooks, Stephen G. *Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. Chapter 4.

Additional Readings:

- Caverley, Jonathan D. “Horses, Nails, and Messages: Three Defense Industries of the Ukraine War.” *Contemporary Security Policy* 44, no. 4 (October 2, 2023): 606–23. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2257965>.
- Gholz, Eugene, and Harvey M Sapolsky. “The Many Lines of Defense: The Political Economy of US Defense Acquisition.” *Journal of Global Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (March 1, 2021): ogaa007. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa007>.
- Friedberg, Aaron L. “The Strategic Implications of Relative Economic Decline.” *Political Science Quarterly* 104, no. 3 (1989): 401–31. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2151271>.

- Gilpin, Robert. *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*. New York: Basic Books, 1975.
- Kurth, James R. “The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes.” *International Organization* 33, no. 1 (1979): 1–34.
- Link, Stefan J. *Forging Global Fordism: Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and the Contest over the Industrial Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020.
- Lobell, Steven E. “The Political Economy of War Mobilization: From Britain’s Limited Liability to a Continental Commitment.” *International Politics* 43, no. 3 (July 1, 2006): 283–304. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800154>.
- Maier, Charles S. “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II.” *International Organization* 31, no. 4 (1977): 607–33.
- Markusen, Ann R. *The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America*. Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. “Arms and Autarky in Modern European History.” *Daedalus* 120, no. 4 (1991): 23–45.
- Tooze, Adam. *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy*. Penguin Books, 2006.
- Wilson, Mark R. *Destructive Creation: American Business and the Winning of World War II*. Philadelphia, Penn: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.

Week 5: Finance

This week we will discuss the role of finance in great power competition. Specifically, we consider how access to external finance can empower states (Schultz and Weingast 2003), undermine them (Kotkin 2010), how financial ties may be weaponized (Farrell and Newman 2019), and the potential for tension between strategic and financial priorities (Kennedy 1981).

Required Readings:

- Schultz, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. “The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition.” *International Organization* 57, no. 1 (January 2003): 3–42. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303571065>.
- Kotkin, Stephen. “The Kiss of Debt: The East Bloc Goes Borrowing.” In *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, edited by Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent. Harvard University Press, 2010.
- Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.” *International Security* 44, no. 1 (July 1, 2019): 42–79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351.
- Kennedy, Paul M. “Strategy versus Finance in Twentieth-Century Great Britain.” *The International History Review* 3, no. 1 (1981): 44–61.

Additional Readings:

- Arrighi, Giovanni. “The World Economy and the Cold War, 1970–1990.” In *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 3: Endings*, vol. 3, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad. The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Bartel, Fritz. *The Triumph of Broken Promises: The End of the Cold War and the Rise of Neoliberalism*. Harvard University Press, 2022.
- Beaulieu, Emily, Gary W. Cox, and Sebastian Saiegh. “Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage.” *International Organization* 66, no. 4 (October 2012): 709–38. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000288>.
- Broz, J. Lawrence. “Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues.” *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005): 479–96. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00137.x>.
- Cameron Ballard-Rosa et al., “Contingent Advantage? Sovereign Borrowing, Democratic Institutions and Global Capital Cycles,” *British Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (2021): 353–73, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000455>.
- De Groot, Michael. “Global Reaganomics: Budget Deficits, Capital Flows and the International Economy.” In *The Reagan Moment: America in the World in the 1980s*, edited by Jonathan Hunt and Simon Miles. Cornell University Press, 2021.
- Ferguson, Niall, and Moritz Schularick. “The Empire Effect: The Determinants of Country Risk in the First Age of Globalization, 1880-1913.” *The Journal of Economic History* 66, no. 2 (2006): 283–312.
- Gartzke, Erik. “The Capitalist Peace.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (2007): 166–91.
- Helleiner, Eric. *States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Kirshner, Jonathan. *Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Lambert, Nicholas A. *Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012.
- McDowell, Daniel. *Bucking the Buck: US Financial Sanctions and the International Backlash against the Dollar*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023.
- Oatley, Thomas. *A Political Economy of American Hegemony: Buildups, Booms, and Busts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Poast, Paul. “Central Banks at War.” *International Organization* 69, no. 1 (January 2015): 63–95. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000265>.
- Zielinski, Rosella Cappella. *How States Pay for Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016.

Week 6: Taxation & Distribution

This week, we will discuss the relationship between international competition and domestic extraction or (re)distribution. Competition can potentially enhance the state’s capacity to extract rents from their population (Queralt 2019) or set the stage for new distributional arrangements (Scheve and Stasvage 2010). At the same time, domestic concerns about distribution or extraction can inform state strategy during periods of competition (Friedberg 2000; Narizny 2003).

Required Readings:

- Queralt, Didac. “War, International Finance, and Fiscal Capacity in the Long Run.” *International Organization* 73, no. 4 (October 2019): 713–53. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818319000250>.
- Scheve, Kenneth, and David Stasavage. “The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation.” *International Organization* 64, no. 4 (October 2010): 529–61. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818310000226>.
- Friedberg, Aaron L. *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000, Chapter 4.
- Narizny, Kevin. “Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy of Rearmament.” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 2 (May 2003): 203–20. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000625>.

Additional Readings:

- Fordham, Benjamin O. *Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. National Security Policy, 1949-51*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998.
- Milner, Helen V., and Dustin Tingley. *Sailing the Water’s Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy*. Princeton University Press, 2015.
- Park, Jeongmin. “International Conflict, Border Security, and State Capacity: Case of British India.” *International Studies Quarterly* 68, no. 3 (September 1, 2024): sqae096. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae096>.
- Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990*. Revised edition. Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992.
- Zielinski, Rosella Cappella. *How States Pay for Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016.

Week 7: Innovation & Technology:

This week we will discuss the impact technological diffusion can have on great power competition (Krepinevich 1994), how great power competition can accelerate innovation and technological development (Gross and Sampat 2023; Tan et al. 2025), and the steps great powers can take to limit the spread of technology (Daniels and Krige 2022; Tan et al. 2025).

Required Readings:

- Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” *The National Interest*, no. 37 (1994): 30–42.
- Gross, Daniel P., and Bhaven N. Sampat. “America, Jump-Started: World War II R&D and the Takeoff of the US Innovation System.” *American Economic Review* 113, no. 12 (December 1, 2023): 3323–56. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20221365>.
- Daniels, Mario, and John Krige. *Knowledge Regulation and National Security in Postwar America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022. Chapter 9.

- Tan, Yeling, Mark Dallas, Henry Farrell, and Abraham Newman. “Driven to Self-Reliance: Technological Interdependence and the Chinese Innovation Ecosystem.” *International Studies Quarterly* 69, no. 2 (June 1, 2025): sqaf017. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf017>.

Additional Readings:

- Adamsky, Dima P. “Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the American Revolution in Military Affairs.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 257–94. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390801940443>.
- Biddle, Stephen, and Ivan Oelrich. “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia.” *International Security* 41, no. 1 (2016): 7–48. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00249.
- Block, Fred L., and Matthew R. Keller. *State of Innovation: The U.S. Government’s Role in Technology Development*. Routledge, 2015.
- Ding, Jeffrey. *Technology and the Rise of Great Powers: How Diffusion Shapes Economic Competition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2024.
- Epstein, Katherine C. *Torpedo: Inventing the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States and Great Britain*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014.
- Evangelista, Matthew. *Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies*. Cornell University Press, 1989.
- Friedberg, Aaron L. “Science, the Cold War, and the American State.” *Diplomatic History* 20, no. 1 (January 1996): 107–18. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1996.tb00254.x>.
- Krige, John. *American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe*. The MIT Press, 2006.
- MacKenzie, Donald. *Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance*. The MIT Press, 1993.
- Miller, Chris. *Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology*. New York: Scribner, 2022.
- O’Mara, Margaret. *The Code: Silicon Valley and the Remaking of America*. Penguin, 2019.
- Weiss, Linda. *America Inc.?: Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014.

Week 8: Energy & Climate

This week, we will first discuss how access to energy resources like oil can empower states (Painter 2012) and the strategies states may pursue to preserve access to energy resources (Kelanic 2016), and the role markets play in offering states coercive leverage (Hugh and Long 2015). Then, we will discuss the relationship between climate and interstate competition (Battistoni and Mann 2023).

Required Readings:

- Painter, David S. “Oil and the American Century.” *Journal of American History* 99, no. 1 (June 1, 2012): 24–39. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jas073>.

- Rosemary A. Kelanic, “The Petroleum Paradox: Oil, Coercive Vulnerability, and Great Power Behavior,” *Security Studies* 25, no. 2 (2016): 181–213, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1171966>.
- Hughes, Llewelyn, and Austin Long. “Is There an Oil Weapon?: Security Implications of Changes in the Structure of the International Oil Market.” *International Security* 39, no. 3 (January 1, 2015): 152–89. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00188.
- Alyssa Battistoni and Geoff Mann, “Climate Bidenomics,” *New Left Review*, no. 143 (October 2023): 55–77.

Additional Readings:

- Allan, Bentley B. “Producing the Climate: States, Scientists, and the Constitution of Global Governance Objects.” *International Organization* 71, no. 1 (ed 2017): 131–62. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818316000321>.
- Colgan, Jeff D. “Climate Change and the Politics of Military Bases.” *Global Environmental Politics* 18, no. 1 (February 1, 2018): 33–51. https://doi.org/10.1162/GLEP_a_00443
- Colgan, Jeff D. *Partial Hegemony: Oil Politics and International Order*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2021.
- Colgan, Jeff D. *Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, “Protecting ‘The Prize’: Oil and the U.S. National Interest,” *Security Studies* 19, no. 3 (2010): 453–85, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2010.505865>.
- Jentleson, Bruce W. *Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade*. Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Painter, David. “Energy and the End of the Evil Empire,” In *The Reagan Moment: America in the World in the 1980s*, edited by Jonathan Hunt and Simon Miles. Cornell University Press, 2021.
- Priest, Tyler. “The Dilemmas of Oil Empire.” *Journal of American History* 99, no. 1 (June 1, 2012): 236–51. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jas065>.
- Sanchez-Sibony, Oscar. *The Soviet Union and the Construction of the Global Market: Energy and the Ascent of Finance in Cold War Europe, 1964–1971*. Cambridge University Press, 2023.
- Schattenberg, Susanne. “Pipeline Construction as ‘Soft Power’ in Foreign Policy. Why the Soviet Union Started to Sell Gas to West Germany, 1966–1970.” *Journal of Modern European History* 20, no. 4 (2022): 554–73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/16118944221130222>.
- Shulman, Peter A. *Coal and Empire: The Birth of Energy Security in Industrial America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015.
- Toprani, Anand. *Oil and the Great Powers: Britain and Germany, 1914 to 1945*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Vitalis, Robert. *Oilcraft: The Myths of Scarcity and Security That Haunt U.S. Energy Policy*. 1st edition. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2020.
- Wight, David M. *Oil Money: Middle East Petrodollars and the Transformation of US Empire, 1967–1988*. Cornell University Press, 2021.
- Winegard, Timothy C. *The First World Oil War*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016.

Week 9: Identity, Myth, and Prestige

To date, our class has primarily focused on the interaction of material factors—how do economic considerations inform security behavior and vice versa. This week, we turn our attention to non-material factors that can guide both security and economic behavior. Specifically, we will discuss how status and identity concerns inform how states allocate economic resources during international competition (Nexon and Musgrave 2018), their acquisition of security goods (Suchman and Eyre 1992) and international economic policy (Miller and Taylor 2017).

Required Readings:

- Musgrave, Paul, and Daniel H. Nexon. “Defending Hierarchy from the Moon to the Indian Ocean: Symbolic Capital and Political Dominance in Early Modern China and the Cold War.” *International Organization* 72, no. 3 (July 2018): 591–626. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000139>.
- Suchman, Mark C., and Dana P. Eyre. “Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation.” *Sociological Forum* 7, no. 1 (1992): 137–61
- Miller, Charles, and Helen Taylor. “Can Economic Interests Trump Ethnic Hostility? Trading Ties versus Outgroup Hostility in Australian Perceptions of China as a Security Threat.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 17, no. 1 (January 1, 2017): 67–99. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcw001>.

Additional Readings:

- Gilady, Lilach. *The Price of Prestige: Conspicuous Consumption in International Relations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018.
- Eyre, Dana, and Mark C. Suchman. “Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach.” In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. “Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety.” *International Organization* 63, no. 3 (July 2009): 425–57. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090158>.
- Murray, Michelle. “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War.” *Security Studies* 19, no. 4 (November 23, 2010): 656–88. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2010.524081>.
- O’Neill, Barry. “Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige,” *Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers* 1560 (2006).
- Grunberg, Isabelle. “Exploring the ‘Myth’ of Hegemonic Stability.” *International Organization* 44, no. 4 (October 1990): 431–77. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300035372>.

Other Topics of Interest:

There are many other topics a course like this could examine. Unfortunately, there is only so much time in a quarter. Below are a few other topics that you may be interested in as well as a handful of recommended readings.

Agriculture and Food:

- Evans, David L. “Harnessing the Amber Waves: U.S. Grain Embargoes against the Soviet Union and the Politics of Insecurity, 1975–1980.” *Cold War History* 24, no. 4 (October 1, 2024): 499–516. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2024.2341239>.
- Milward, Alan S. *War, Economy and Society, 1939-1945*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, Chapter 8.
- Offer, Avner. *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
- Olson, Mancur. *The Economics of the Wartime Shortage, A History of British Food Supplies in the Napoleonic War and in World Wars I and II*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1963.
- Winders, Bill. *The Politics of Food Supply: U.S. Agricultural Policy in the World Economy*. Yale University Press, 2009.
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Information Technology and Telecommunications:

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